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DISTINCTIVE CITIZENSHIP
REFUGEES, SUBJECTS AND POST-COLONIAL STATE IN
INDIA’S PARTITION
Ravinder Kaur
Roskilde University, Denmark
ABSTRACT The refugee, in India’s Partition history, appears as an enigmatic construct – part
pitiful, part heroic, though mostly shorn of agency – representing the surface of the human
tragedy of Partition. Yet this archetype masks the undercurrent of social distinctions that
produced hierarchies of post-colonial citizenship within the mass of refugees. The core principle
of the official resettlement policy was self-rehabilitation, that is, the ability to become a
productive citizen of the new nation state without state intervention. Thus, the onus of
performing a successful transition – from refugee to citizen – lay on the resourcefulness of the
refugees rather than the state. This article traces the differing historical trajectories followed by
‘state-dependent’ and ‘self-reliant’ refugees in the making of modern citizenry in post-colonial
India.
Keywords: refugees, citizens, post-colonial state, social class, Partition, India
INTRODUCTION
In the history of India’s Partition, the ‘refugee’ is a central – almost mythical – figure
without which the national histories of India and Pakistan can hardly be told. The
processes of Partition become particularly palpable when narrated through the lives of
ordinary people who experienced violence and homelessness in the course of the
boundary making between the two states. Thus, the official narrative of Partition is
built around an abstract notion of ‘refugee experience’ wherein the multitude of
refugees is often articulated as a singular body with a common origin, trajectory and
destiny. This archetypal refugee appears as an enigmatic construct – part pitiful, part
heroic, though mostly shorn of agency – representing the surface of the human tragedy
of Partition, even as it masks the tense undercurrents and distinctive state practices of
resettlement.
Partition scholarship has very recently begun un-forming this construct to excavate
the underlying differences. A study of Bengal refugees has shown how an authentic
refugee type within the state discourse was fashioned after the Punjab experience of
internecine violence and movement.1 This frame seldom fitted the Bengal refugees,
whose journeys were not always entwined with dramatic episodes of violence and who
were, thus, discursively located outside the orbit of authentic ‘refugee-ness’. Elsewhere KA
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I have shown the affects of social differences on state policies of resettlement and the
ways in which refugees were segregated and isolated – untouchables from upper castes,
single women from families, poor from rich – in accord with prevalent social norms.2
The transit camps and permanent refugee housing colonies were hardly levelling spaces
where differences of class, geography, caste and gender would disappear against the
larger-than-life canvas of Partition. The obvious question then is: how did this
landscape of social differences among the refugees translate into a modern citizenry of
post-colonial India? And what forms of hierarchies or grades within the citizenry were
affected through this production of difference? The intricate linkages between the
categories of refugees and citizens, and the ways in which one un/easily morphs into
the other, are yet to be fully explored vis-à-vis Partition history.
The central analytical premise is that the making of and becoming post-colonial
citizen-subjects were linked to the refugees’ ability to self-rehabilitate rather than
depend on the state for survival and recognition. Self-rehabilitation, here, suggests a
governmental technology, pursued by the Indian state, aimed at producing self-
supporting citizens out of the mass of refugees. In a way, it symbolized state-ordained
rites de passage of growing up – from child to adult – and taking responsibility for
oneself rather than depending on the state. Clearly, refugees were seen as minors who
were being pushed by the paternalistic state to become adult citizens. In policy terms,
this meant becoming proper subjects befitting the nation without being a burden on
the state. In practice, becoming proper subjects depended on one’s successful
deployment of social capital, that is, one’s possession not only of financial resources but
also of useful social networks and cultural distinctions.3 An individual’s success in
setting up homes, businesses and gaining employment, then, became the success of
state policies, whereas failure to be self-reliant was an individual failure that the state
was not responsible for. One’s ability to survive outside of refugee camps and state
institutions was linked to one’s prospects of becoming relevant and full-fledged citizens
of the new nation. Thus, the emerging citizenry itself was shaped by the differing
trajectories of movement and resettlement traced by the refugees.
The following is an account of Partition resettlement history from two perspectives
– state-dependent and self-reliant refugees – and their different journeys from being
refugees to citizens in the new nation state. The account is based on extensive fieldwork
conducted over a six-year period in refugee resettlement colonies in Delhi.4 It also relies
upon a vast newspaper archive as well as a variety of official documents.
DISTINCTIVE CITIZENSHIP
The notion of citizenship within Partition historiography is largely considered as given,
and an uncomplicated one at that. This is because in most cases the legal status of
citizenship was automatically conferred upon ‘displaced persons’ in post-colonial
India.5 Thus, enquiries into the transformative processes – of refugees into citizens –
have hardly been pushed beyond the legal-technical boundaries of citizenship where the
rights and responsibilities of individuals are considered universal in relation to the
nation state.6 Such a narrow conceptualization of citizenship limits our understanding4
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of the architecture of social differences upon which the modern Indian citizenry was
based. In this article, citizenship is conceptualized as ‘a set of self constituting practices
in different settings of powers’, where power itself is understood as a social technology
that induces being made and self-making.7 In other words, citizenship is seen as a
constant work-in-progress, shaped and realized in everyday life through strategies that
newcomers adopt to negotiate different governmental authorities, and the state
practices that seek to classify and define displaced people; pressure on the newcomers
to integrate and self-define underpins this overlapping space between refugees and
citizens. Far from being a universal and unified category in post-Partition India, I
argue, citizenship appears as a polymorphous field upon which the distinctions and
hierarchies of new subjects were negotiated with the post-colonial state. This distinctive
citizenship becomes particularly visible within the spectacular imaginary of ‘refugee’ –
a discursive lens through which to view the simultaneous processes of being made and
becoming citizens of post-colonial India. While the first process suggests a set of
transformative state practices to resettle the displaced populations, the second suggests
an active effort by the displaced people themselves to gain resources and status by
appropriating and redirecting those state practices. In both instances, the state’s
interventions to resolve the ‘refugee problem’ were influential in shaping the new
citizenry, even though it sometimes reified the old social distinctions and prejudices of,
for example, class and caste.
Two related arguments that underpin the central idea concern the identity and
imaginary of ‘refugee’ that both state and migrants sought to define and appropriate.
First, the label ‘refugee’ accrued moral capital and opened fresh political terrain upon
which citizenship was to be negotiated with the post-colonial state. The condition of
being ‘refugee’ was a significant tool to gain political influence and to bargain
concessions from the new state – and therefore subject to negotiations that could
enhance one’s position in the new society. This is evident in the way a number of
pressure groups and organizations were formed with the prefix refugee, such as ‘Refugee
Protection Society’, ‘All India Refugee Welfare Association’ and ‘Refugees Old Motor
Parts Dealers Association’ to name a few. It signified a moral community of victims and
survivors of genocidal violence who were rendered homeless in the making of the post-
colonial nation state. Second, while being ‘refugee’ formed the broad basis for
negotiations with the state, it was the social distinctions – based on class, caste, gender,
age and geography – within the displaced populations that shaped differing modes and
outcomes of interaction with the governmental agencies in the different locations of the
refugee camps and beyond. The word ‘distinction’ is used in a double sense to convey
both differences and privileges accrued from differing levels of social capital
accumulation that displaced individuals, families and communities possessed. At the
bottom of this register of social distinctions were the state-dependent refugees who
barely possessed any social capital or bargaining power to gain prime resources from the
state agencies upon displacement. They were often the low caste groups, the rural and
urban poor, and single women, who constituted the marginalized and who,
consequently, had little influence on the ongoing political processes. At the top, on the
other hand, were the exceptions, prominent men, and their families, often honoured
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and rewarded by the authorities for the services they rendered to the colonial state and
whose experiences of movement did not always follow the standard narrative of loss
and chaotic escape.8 They depended on the state not for survival, but rather for
recognition of their social eminence. They were resourceful, politically astute and well
entrenched in useful social networks that came in handy while interacting with the
state authorities. They were seen as natural leaders of the refugees and authentic
representatives of ‘refugee experiences’ by the state authorities, even though sometimes
their own experiences were far removed from those of the ordinary refugees they were
representing. These individuals were drawn from Rais (pronounced ra-ees), or wealthy
families, who traditionally took up specific social causes and performed community
service and were often at the helm of political leadership; sarkari afsar, literally
government officers, who were endowed with social prestige that came with their rank
in the colonial administration; and middle-level prosperous traders, businessmen,
teachers, local community leaders, who derived and magnified their authority from the
community resettlement efforts they were engaged in.
In the following pages, I describe the everyday life of the refugees to show how: (a)
the governmental imaginary of ‘the refugee’ became a powerful framing device for state
policies that positioned the post-colonial state as an empathetic guardian of displaced
people, as well as an all-too-visible screen behind which the state functionaries practised
policy distinctively; (b) even as the displaced populations were defined through the
state’s imaginary of ‘refugee’, the label was actively appropriated, employed and given
new meanings by the migrants themselves; and finally (c) the new citizenry was shaped
distinctively in relation to refugees’ degree of dependence on the state for survival and
recognition.
IMAGINARY OF ‘REFUGEE’
‘Refugee’ was the most popular term used in Indian newspapers, eyewitness accounts
and statements by the political leadership to describe nearly ten million people who
were forced to move into India by the internecine violence from mid-1947 onwards. It
also formed a popular imaginary through which displaced people were now viewed as
helpless, homeless and in need of rehabilitation. This view is fully reflected in Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s description of these people as ‘unfortunate refugees from
Punjab and listening to their stories it is difficult not to be moved’.9 An eyewitness
account entitled ‘Helpless Thousands in West Punjab’ described ‘thousands of Hindu
and Sikh refugees … depressed and half-starved, [all] but resigned’.10 The newspapers
were replete with heart-rending photos of men, women and children huddled in
camps, cooking food at the roadside or just sleeping on pavements. A photo feature
depicting the situation of refugees, entitled ‘Influx of Refugees into Delhi’, appeared
with captions such as ‘refugees arriving at the Delhi railway station’, ‘refugee receiving
first aid treatment’, ‘two refugee families’ and ‘refugees receiving their rations’.11 The
very ordinary human activities of cooking, sleeping, sitting with one’s family or just
waiting in a queue had become special ‘refugee’ activities in this imaginary – each
meant to underscore the plight and misfortune of the dislocated people.12 The act of4
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dislocation – matter out of place – had become the defining characteristic of the
newcomers, and ‘refugee’ was the prism through which their everyday life was now
described.13 In other words, all previous identities and social distinctions were
collapsed to constitute the ‘refugee’, an archetype of dislocated people in need of
relocation within the post-colonial citizenry.
In the official Indian account entitled The Story of Rehabilitation, the ‘refugee’ is a
generic product not of the state’s failure to protect its citizens, but of ‘a new and
pernicious doctrine [that] had come to poison men’s minds … arson, rapine and
murder were let loose [and] people were uprooted from their homes’.14 The ‘refugee’ is
a multitudinous body of ‘five million people crazed with fear, shattered in body and
mind, most of them pitifully destitute [who] had to be fed, clothed, protected from the
ravages of disease, found shelter and homes, where they could be slowly nursed back to
some semblance of lost dignity’.15 Despite the occasional plural form used to describe
the mass migration, the official narrative casts millions of individuals, a colossal
demography, as a single multitude of being – anonymous, helpless, fearful and
dispossessed subjects at the mercy of the state authorities for their bodily and moral
healing.
The ‘refugee’ is also the raw material out of which modern citizens were produced,
once the bodies had been healed and spirits restored in the refugee camps. We are told
that ‘when the refugee was sent back into the normal work-a-day world, he was restored
and refreshed; discarding the crutches of the camp, he was able to respond to measures
to make him indistinguishable from his fellow men, just another happy, useful
citizen’.16 The refugee body, for the purposes of policy-making, is a dispirited male
body that can be repaired successfully, while the female bodies remain mostly absent,
appearing only to signify the atrocities of sexual violence and abductions by the enemy.
The refugee camps are the transformative spaces where governmental policies and
practices of ‘rehabilitation’ bear fruit in recharging the broken spirits and incarnating a
new citizenry.
The new label ‘refugee’ was also favoured by the displaced populations and often
used interchangeably with Punjabi/Hindi terms like panahgeer and sharnarthi, literally
meaning those in need of shelter and security. Despite the interchangeable usage in
everyday parlance, ‘refugee’ was more than a literal expression of homelessness and
insecurity and less than a full legal categorization in the administration of displaced
people. The identity of refugee was affixed through official registration of displaced
persons as refugees. This brief, though important, ritual was performed upon arrival,
when a refugee card with name, registration number and date of arrival was issued. This
card was essential proof in gaining a ration card, temporary and permanent housing,
admission to educational institutions and employment earmarked for the Partition
migrants. The state practice of formalizing identities through the issuing of a ‘refugee
card’, as it was popularly known, became an important first step on the road to
becoming a proper citizen-subject of the new state.
In legal terms, though, the word ‘refugee’ had little meaning since the actual laws
pertaining to migrant property and compensation made use of terms like ‘displaced
person’ or ‘evacuee’.17 The very usage of the term to describe displacement in official as
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well as academic discourse is instructive – especially when it was never employed in the
legal sense. During India’s Partition in 1947, the international legal mechanisms
concerning refugees – or ‘stateless’ people – were still not in place, but the ideas and
debates around refugees and nation states were commonplace.18 The forced migrants
to India (and Pakistan) were not stateless in the sense of in need of rights, since they
were assured of citizenship rights upon arrival. The frequent usage seems to have had
an emotive function, besides being a governmental technology of population
classification, to draw attention to the helplessness and misery the migrants faced in
everyday negotiations over resources such as food, housing, medical aid and
employment opportunities. And, more importantly, it helped emphasize the state’s
generosity in helping the displaced populations to overcome their miserable situation.
TECHNOLOGY OF SELF-REHABILITATION
The core principle of the official resettlement policy was self-rehabilitation, that is, the
ability to become a productive citizen of the new nation state without state
intervention.19 This governmental technology of making citizens out of refugees was
based on two prerequisites: (a) being dislocated and (b) being able to survive without
the state’s help. While the act of dislocation was mired in violence, loss and defeat, the
act of survival independent of the state indicated success in overcoming those defeats.
This individual feat – of turning defeat into success – facilitated one’s entry into the
new citizenry and formed subjects worthy of the new nation. The emerging process
was, however, fraught with contradictions and tensions: while those who owned
sufficient social capital were in little need of prodding from the state to be self-reliant,
those who had no capital had little choice but to depend on the state. In practice, this
meant that those who did not need the state for basic subsistence on an everyday basis
were better placed to make the transition to citizenship than those who depended on
the state. Thus, the effectiveness of the policy of self-rehabilitation supported a
constituency that was already resourceful in one way or another.
To begin with, the policy was based on the useful employment of able-bodied
refugees, while women, the infirm and disabled people were left on the margins. The
official stance was that ‘every grown up and able bodied refugee had to be found gainful
employment. No one willing to work could be denied an opportunity to earn a
living.’20 The minister for rehabilitation, Mohanlal Saksena (1948–50), expressed this
vision while reflecting upon the problems of rehabilitation: ‘the energy and courage,
enterprise and self reliance of the displaced persons themselves led me to hope that it
may be given to me to assist these stricken people, and uprooted millions, in their
settlement; and if possible, in making them the pioneers of a new social order’.21 The
emphasis was on self-reliance and self-rehabilitation, though under the watchful eyes of
the state authorities. Those who did not show the promise of self-reliance, that is, who
needed financial support from the state, were chided for being ‘lazy and feckless, losing
all initiative, self-respect and self confidence’.22 The ‘free doles’ were seen as a
disincentive that had a demoralizing effect and were stopped soon after Mr Saksena
took over the minister’s office. He later wrote: ‘paradoxical as it may seem, the4
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discontinuance of gratuitous relief has been one of the biggest strokes of rehabilitation,
for it gave the “drone” a shake up, and set him thinking as to how best to rehabilitate
himself ’ (inverted commas in original).23 The allusion to ‘drone’, a male honey bee, is
significant with its double meanings of parasitic loafer living off others’ labour as well
as remote-controlled object that is not its own agent. The refugees who survived on
cash handouts were necessarily seen as lazy and unmotivated, irrespective of other
factors such as ill health or the inability to find employment, especially in a new
location. The withdrawal of state support was seen as a necessary action that turned
passive recipients of aid into active architects of their own destiny.
The ability to self-rehabilitate, it seems, was crucial in becoming an active citizen of
the new nation. The success criterion of transcending refugee-ness was measured as:
‘only when the displaced person has shed his dependence on government or private
doles has he been fully rehabilitated’.24 Often those able to look after themselves were
the resourceful ones who had, for example, transferable government jobs that reinstated
them upon movement, assets that could be liquidated or exchanged and capital to
invest in new businesses. Those who could afford to support themselves seldom lived
in refugee camps for long periods. In fact, the government had created two types of
refugee housing facilities – self-supported and state supported. The newcomers arriving
at the refugee registration office in Delhi, for example, were asked if they could afford
their own food and clothing rations.25 If they could, then they were assigned the
concrete-built old military barracks, while others were sent to camps where cloth tents
from the Second World War were used. From the very moment of arrival, an
administrative filter was created that weeded out resource-rich people from the mass of
refugees. Thus, those left within the camps were the socially weakest groups in
comparison to those who could earn their livelihood independently of state aid. Mr
Saksena, in fact, gave credit to the ‘displaced persons, especially outside camps, that …
have made a supreme effort to earn their livelihood and to stand on their own feet.
Many of them have done remarkably well in rehabilitating themselves without the aid
of the Government.’26 The physical distance from the state-run refugee camps was
clearly seen as a sign of forward movement towards being a full citizen.
This approach, however, left out women and disabled and infirm people without
family support networks from the possibility of fully forsaking state support and,
consequently, becoming self-rehabilitated full citizens of India. At the end of his report
on refugee rehabilitation, Mr Saksena wrote a chapter called ‘miscellaneous problems –
unattached women etc.’ where the fate of single women is discussed sympathetically.
While he earlier insisted that refugees be put to work to achieve rehabilitation, here he
pre-empted any discussion by circumscribing the women as a ‘permanent liability’ to
the state.27 He explained that ‘from the very beginning the Government of India have
[sic] undertaken responsibility for the maintenance and care of women and children’
and that this should continue to be ‘a responsibility of the state’.28 Unattached women
were wards of the state, to be protected and cared for in the absence of family or a male
guardian. The state took its role as a patriarch seriously enough to construct exclusive
camps for unattached women that kept the inmates in seclusion. For example,
Kasturba Niketan camp in the Lajpat Nagar area of Delhi was secured with high barbed
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wire and guarded round the clock so that no male intruders could enter the premises.29
The camp protocol did not even allow male visitors inside the private lodgings. This
seclusion of unattached women, often young widows, was in keeping with the
contemporary norms of controlling female sexuality and avoiding socially
unsanctioned reproduction.30 The young unattached women were considered unsafe
outside the protective control of family or state. There were not many avenues for these
women to self-rehabilitate and shed their dependence upon the state. The resettlement
policies were largely tailored to meet the needs of an ideal type, i.e. the able-bodied,
masculine refugee. The frequent use of the masculine pronoun in official writings
suggests that the object of the state’s gaze was primarily the male refugee – the female
refugees were deemed to be included within that archetype. The ‘unattached’ women,
kept in seclusion and guarded by a patriarchal state, had few options to become
independent of the state.
STATE OF DEPENDENCE
The paradoxes within the self-rehabilitation policy are best viewed on the premises of
the now defunct Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation.31 The ministry ceased to exist
in 1965, when officially the rehabilitation work was considered finished even though
the settlement of claims was far from over. The unfinished work was entrusted to a new
department of rehabilitation, formed with the objective of completing the ‘residual
work of rehabilitation’. This administrative move suggested that resettlement, at least
in the eyes of the state, had been concluded and that whatever was left unfinished was
a mere residue unworthy of full attention. Yet, during my fieldwork, the queues at the
premises of the rehabilitation department suggested that not only had the resettlement
programmes never been fully concluded, but also the old men and women waiting in
the queues had never been able to fulfil the official goal of self-rehabilitation. More
than five decades later, they were still making regular trips to the resettlement office to
get their ‘cases’ settled. This ageing generation now constituted the residue of the
Partition upheaval – made to wait for long hours and dealt with impatiently by young
officers who had little comprehension of events which, from their point of view,
belonged to history.
I met Kewal Ram and his wife, Kanta Devi, at the resettlement office during my
routine visits to consult the department’s record room. Both were in their late sixties
and had moved, together with their respective families, from Lahore to Delhi in 1947
at the height of the violence. They started their lives anew in a refugee camp located at
the historic site of Kingsway that had been built in connection with the 1911 Delhi
Durbar in honour of King George V. The camp was a basic facility where the
inhabitants were given bare minimum rations and financial aid for a limited period.
This particular camp housed those who had no private means of support and
necessarily had to depend on the state. Both their families, Kewal Ram’s and his wife’s,
had lost whatever they had owned, since they were forced to leave Lahore in haste.
Kewal Ram’s father used to run a store selling everyday household items in the locality
where they lived. The shop was a rented property and that meant they had no claim to4
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commercial property in lieu of property lost in Lahore. Their only hope was to have a
rentable shop allotted to them by the government since it was impossible to buy
property in Delhi because of the sky-high property prices. The situation was made
worse because better-off migrants had already begun purchasing commercial and
residential property in Delhi, reportedly at exorbitant prices. A news report suggested
that premises in Delhi were being ‘acquired by Lahore businessmen by paying pagris
(“premium”) ranging between Rupees 50,000–100,000’.32 These were enormous sums
for ordinary people, who could not compete in an open market to acquire assets in
order to earn their livelihood. Kewal Ram’s father was told that he could rent a shop if
any were left after the disbursement of property claims had been dealt with. In the
meantime, the father and son began hawking homemade pakoras (lentil snacks) in the
neighbourhood colonies to make ends meet. They would regularly return, without fail,
to the resettlement office to enquire about the possibility of renting a shop. The years
passed, and Kewal Ram’s father died without ever re-creating his Lahore shop in Delhi;
the responsibility for running the family fell upon his son. After persistent pleas, in the
early 1960s the family, now consisting of the young couple’s four daughters and
mother, was allotted a two-room flat in the newly constructed Old Double storey area
of Lajpat Nagar. They had started their hawking business again, even though it was
tougher now since they lived far away from the city in a sparsely inhabited area.
When I met the couple in 2002, they were waiting outside the office for their turn
to argue their case for the shop that had been promised to Kewal Ram’s father in the
late 1940s. Since I was working on the ‘history’ of Partition, I was not expecting to
meet people who were still arguing their decades-old cases before the settlement officer.
Yet each person in the queue had a different story to tell – about withheld pensions,
promised accommodation or jobs, unsettled compensation claims, among other things
– that indicated that their lives were not settled even though decades had lapsed.
Partition was not history for them; they were living its consequences in their everyday
lives. In fact, the archive at the resettlement office is called a ‘record room’ and not an
archive, I was told, because ‘cases were still live’ and so cannot be officially designated
an archive.33 Kewal Ram showed me his refugee registration card that he had carefully
kept all these years, along with a bundle of official letters concerning his plea. The
refugee card was the sole evidence he had to testify to his claims of dislocation and all
the hardships that followed it.
I asked them why they continued to pursue their case after all these years, especially
when there was little indication that the plea would be entertained. The answer was
simple – it was a matter of earning a livelihood, as they had no pension or family
support that would take care of them. Their daughters had been married off and were
unable to look after them because of pressure from their husbands’ families. Their only
income was what they earned from the makeshift stall they had set up some years
before. On compassionate grounds, and with due intervention from the local
municipal councillor, the couple had been allowed to put up a stall near the newly
established Central Market in Lajpat Nagar by the municipal authorities. This
arrangement was ended in the early 2000s when the municipality decided to demolish
all ‘unauthorized’ structures in the area in an effort to curb illegal constructions.34
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Their stall was found to be an unauthorized structure by the municipality and was
removed. This fresh setback was the reason why they went back to the settlement office
to find out if they could pursue their livelihood legally in a rented shop. The answer
was a clear ‘no’, as they soon found out, because the settlement office did not have any
jurisdiction over the municipality. It no longer had the mandate or resources to make
such decisions, especially after the department had been amalgamated within a larger
full-fledged ministry.
The clerk at the settlement office, whom I interacted with everyday, told me that
these people wasted everyone’s time by pressing on with useless cases.35 He would
helpfully draw my attention to the well-known ‘success stories’ of refugees who,
through sheer hard work, had built their fortunes.36 In contrast, the people who
queued up at his office had somehow failed to show the same initiative that made
success out of failure. They were still looking to the state for support after many
decades, long after most other refugees had taken control of their lives. The lack of
enthusiasm among the officials was compounded by the fact that the department was
to be downsized further. Most were waiting to be transferred to other departments that
were considered active and relevant. The resettlement department had ceased to be
relevant in the larger scheme of things, even though it remained relevant to people like
Kewal Ram whose most important possession was a refugee card. The only capital he
owned was the moral capital of being a refugee, which he strategically employed in an
effort to gain a foothold in his old age.
While Kewal Ram and his family had moved out of the refugee camp, they hardly
possessed any tools to be self-reliant outside the camp. Though at a policy level refugees
were to be given loans to start businesses, in practice it was difficult to obtain them
since one needed guarantees and references from community leaders to safeguard the
loan. It was especially difficult for people like Kewal Ram who clearly did not have
important social connections or any property in lieu of which they could make a claim
to assets like better off refugees. The most they had been able to manage was a
makeshift stall near the market through the interventions of their local councillor. This
too was taken away from them since the stall had never been legally endorsed. They
had not shown qualities of self-reliance that would make them citizens befitting the
new nation. At the same time, their own efforts at becoming meaningful citizens – by
attempting to start small business – were frequently thwarted by various governmental
authorities. Their stories did not fit in the popular ‘failure-to-success’ narrative, and
neither did they make the crucial ‘refugee-to-citizen’ transition by distancing
themselves from state dependence.
THE RELIABLE SELF
Though the contemporary discourse on refugees, at the time of Partition, was mostly
sympathetic in drawing popular attention to the ‘plight’ of the generic refugee, very few
discursive fragmentations were made to highlight social differences within the migrant
population. This is why the following news report, entitled ‘The Ways of Rich
Refugees’, stands out as exceptional in its description of upper-class refugees:4
38
C
ul
tu
ra
la
nd
S
oc
ia
lH
is
to
ry
03KaurCASH6.4:02Jackson  23/9/09  12:39  Page 438
they buy the best of everything without regard for the prices. From 2 p.m., provided
the weather is not too bad, they begin to go up and down the Mall, the men talking
about their losses in Lahore and the women about the dresses and fancy goods they had
to leave behind. There are a number of restaurants on the Mall which every evening are
filled with bored, well-dressed men and women. You cannot mistake the look on these
refugee faces. While some are thus killing time, others roam the Mall looking for
officials of the East Punjab Government, members of the Legislative Assembly, retired
judges and others. From them they get the latest information from Lahore. This
information is then embellished and passed on from one group to another. Highly
coloured accounts of disturbances causing dismay and demoralization are thus passed
on as factual news. In this mood of self-pity the refugees look for people to blame and
find their own leaders the handiest.37
The above is one of the very few newspaper reports that focused on the wealthier
sections of the migrant population. These refugees, compared to the camp refugees,
were able not only to meet their everyday needs of food and shelter on their own, but
could even afford to maintain their normal lifestyle in exile. They regret their losses and
speculate about the ‘disturbances’ taking place in the plains – of which they have little
direct knowledge. They appear more as spectators than actors in the Partition drama.
This theme of loss had become a meme through which one could recount, embellish
and impress others of the riches one owned. Even this moment of suffering could be
turned into a technique of reification of one’s social status. The theme of loss and the
detailed recounting of all the wealth that had been left behind were frequent themes I
encountered among the upper-class refugees in Delhi during my fieldwork. In contrast,
the lower middle-class refugees were often less detailed about their losses and would
rather gloss over the subject completely. This contrast made sense, after my initial
surprise, since one had to own something in the first place in order to lose it. The lower
middle class and the poorer sections of, for example, untouchables had few assets and
consequently a more limited discourse of loss. Clearly, the upper classes were not the
target section of the state’s policy of self-rehabilitation since the wealthy migrants had
sufficient means to live without state intervention. Many of them had escaped violence
in cities like Lahore and Delhi by moving to hill resorts long before the riots broke out
at the onset of summer.38 This also happened to be the season when the elite – high-
ranking government officials, merchants and big landowners among others –
traditionally migrated to the cooler climate of the hills along with the annual migration
of the colonial government.39 The migrant population in this news report, unlike the
inhabitants of the refugee camps, was well versed in the ways the state machinery
functioned, which put them in an advantageous position to begin with. Similarly, their
personal acquaintance with the state officials and policy-makers was an asset that could
be employed when resettling businesses and families in the new place.
A good example of social networking to gain resources is underscored in the
following letter to Minister of Rehabilitation M.L. Saksena from one Mrs Kamla
Kaushal asking for an allotment of a bungalow plot in the posh environs of the newly
developed Nizamuddin colony in lieu of lost property in Pakistan. These plots were
much in demand and were, in fact, a source of conflict between the Old Fort camp
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refugees and the authorities since the former were initially promised allotments in the
colony.40 The letter begins in rather deferential, though direct, terms:
I beg to apply for one of the larger plots in Nizamuddin area. I am [a] refugee from
NWFP and a widow having lost my husband during the communal riots in 1947 at
Bannu. I beg to state that I was allotted one of the Pusa Road hutments, which I
surrendered requesting at the same time that I should be given a plot of land. Last of
all I beg to state that I have been labouring and tilling in the Nizamuddin area and I
hope that work shall not be ignored. In this connection it may be added that I was
photographed with Mrs Saksena [the Minister’s wife] and other ladies while working
in that area and the photo appeared in the Illustrated Weekly [a magazine] of that
month.41
Mrs Kaushal signed off this letter from an address located in the upmarket locality of
Connaught Place rather than a refugee camp. The most important identity, however,
to gain the plot was that of a refugee, since the locality was being developed for the
resourceful refugees. An official note invited ‘displaced persons from Western Pakistan
who are gainfully employed in Delhi’ to submit bids for the 60 x 116 ft plots.42 The
bid could be placed against compensation certificates issued by the Ministry in lieu of
property lost in Pakistan. Those refugees who were neither gainfully employed nor in
possession of compensation certificates were not eligible for the plot allotments. The
fact that Mrs Kaushal became a widow during the Partition violence formed the
emotive context of her plea. She states in her letter that she gave up the Pusa Road
‘hutments’, which were quarter of the size of the bungalows, in the hope of a larger
bungalow plot. She mentions that she had been ‘labouring and tilling’ [sic] the land,43
and, most importantly, that she had been photographed with the Minister’s wife, who
had visited the area. This last bit of information makes the plea more interesting since
the photograph with Mrs Saksena constitutes the most emphatic argument forwarded
in order to secure the plot. This last argument took up at least as much space as her
being a refugee and a widow in her case for the plot. Clearly, Mrs Kaushal believed that
this important bit of additional information would strengthen her chances of securing
a plot. Whether the strategy worked or not is unclear since further correspondence on
her plea is missing from the files. But what is clear is that social connections were seen
as an important tool in gaining a foothold in the new place.
The needs and strategies of the elite refugees were, clearly, different from those of the
ordinary refugees. The common thread was the emotive frame of being ‘refugee’,
despite differing experiences, which prefaced all demands for houses, promotions and
easy loans. An exchange of correspondence between Devi Dayal, a high-ranking
bureaucrat from the Ministry of External Affairs, and the Ministry of Rehabilitation
highlights this contrast. Devi Dayal was allotted one of the much-coveted plots in the
Nizamuddin area in 1949. Far from being happy, he wrote a long letter to the Ministry
of Rehabilitation complaining about his situation and asking for an easy loan to
construct his house on the plot. In the letter he begins by emphasizing his status as a
registered refugee, even though a little later he explains his migration as a ‘regular
transfer’ that brought him to India. It was a common practice of the state to arrange44
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job transfers from Pakistan to India (and vice versa) for its employees. A special Transfer
Bureau was set up for this purpose as early as 1947.44 This way, the employees did not
lose their monthly income, accommodation, provident funds or any pensions upon
migration. His complaints included the following:
By transfer to India, I have lost 22 years [of ] permanent service; I have till now not
been paid the balance in my Provident Fund; I lost all my movable and immovable
property in Pakistan and have not received any compensation or rehabilitation
facilities; I have four children receiving expensive education in schools and colleges but
have not obtained any loan, advance, scholarship or other concession from public
funds in aid of their education.45
The list of grievances was a bit exaggerated and contradictory since, under the transfer
rules, employees did not lose seniority and were looked upon rather sympathetically by
the state. The provident funds were paid to all employees upon transfer, as agreed under
the terms of transfer. Paradoxically, Devi Dayal claims not to have received any
compensation against lost property, even though his letter was occasioned by the
allotment of a bungalow plot for the same. His letter also states that his children
continued to receive an expensive education, though he complains about not having
received any aid to subsidize it. This last bit is specially striking since for the vast
majority basic survival – food and shelter – was at stake, rather than seeking subsidies
to finance expensive private education. For most ordinary refugees, a regular income,
accommodation and the undisrupted education of their children were more of a luxury
than a requirement. In Devi Dayal’s account, one does not witness the events of
violence and chaos that constitute many Partition accounts. Partition was the occasion
of his movement to India, not a constant determinant in his life as a post-colonial
citizen. This letter basically showed how very different spheres of reality existed in the
otherwise generalized universe of refugees.
Although refugees like Devi Dayal had little experience of the hardships implied by
the label ‘refugee’, the ‘plight of refugees’ was a frequent meme used by the elite to
mobilize refugees into a political force. In 1949 the Refugee Protection Society (RPS)
decided to field ‘refugee’ candidates in the state Assembly elections since the
government was not seen as doing enough to rehabilitate refugees. Charges of
negligence had long been levelled against the government by refugees dependent upon
the state for loans and the allotment of housing etc. In a letter addressed to RPS
President Diwan Chaman Lall, a wealthy barrister from the Punjab and a refugee, a
society member noted the problem as follows:
dissatisfaction has very much increased amongst the refugees and they openly charge
that the Government has failed to solve the problem even to a negligible degree. Some
of the more enthusiastic among them even doubt the intentions of the Government.
This, however, seems to be more due to a sense of desperation rather than a true picture
of the facts.46
While describing the sense of neglect and desperation felt by refugees in need of state
support, the writer refers to the refugees as ‘them’, thereby clearly separating himself
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(and the RPS) from the ordinary refugees. The lamentations of the refugees are seen as
exaggerations not based on true facts. Even while representing the refugees’ state, the
writer seems to be an arbiter between the refugees and the government rather than a
partisan voice of the refugees.
The list of twenty-three election candidates suggested by the society underscores this
distance between the refugees and their representatives. To begin with, a number of
them are variously described as ‘refugee business magnate’, ‘important refugee
industrialist’, ‘refugee merchant’, ‘refugee businessman’ and ‘refugee leader’, among
others.47 Such descriptions carry inbuilt paradoxes that, at once, convey social prestige,
economic power and influence conjoined with the emotive and helpless state of being
‘refugee’. Interestingly, none of the candidates actually lived in the refugee camps;
instead, a number of their addresses were located in the fashionable district of
Connaught Place. Their financial losses were minimal since there were private agencies
that sold or exchanged evacuee property in both India and Pakistan.48 In any case, the
state policy of compensation made it possible to make good one’s losses provided one
had the proper documentation and a bit of patience. Most of the candidates were high
profile individuals, well-established businessmen, political leaders, wealthy
philanthropists, influential community leaders and professional doctors and lawyers.
The only common bond they had with the refugees whose experiences they were
representing was formed by the act of dislocation and the official refugee identity cards
they had been issued with. This mobilization did not lead to a political formation but
became a fertile ground from where ‘distinguished’ members of the refugee community
emerged to provide leadership and direction.49 They were successful examples of the
state’s policy of becoming good citizens – as they had been self-reliant and productive
from an early stage. But they also represented the hollowness of the state’s vision since
their supposed transformative journeys – of turning failure into success and thus
gaining a meaningful place in the new citizenry – had not always been travelled. Their
abridged journeys, if anything, created unfavourable contrasts with those who had to
struggle for basic survival in their everyday lives.
PERFORMING CITIZENSHIP
The refugee registration card, in the historical trajectory of self-rehabilitation, carries a
particular significance. While it generally symbolized the official recognition of one’s
dislocation and earned concessions and resources from the state, it also conveyed a state
of helplessness and dependence for some whose journeys had been turbulent and
difficult. To others still, such as Devi Dayal and Diwan Chaman Lall, the acquisition
of refugee cards was a legible entry into borrowed ‘refugee experiences’ and concessions
even when their own journeys did not bear much resemblance to the popular narratives
of forced movement. These differing meanings invested in refugee cards were made
apparent when a former resident of Rawalpindi narrated his personal story of
movement, homelessness and long struggles to me. At the end of his narration, which
took place in front of his two sons, he offered to show me his refugee card, which he
had kept but never shown to anyone. The card was meaningless in his current life,4
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except for its historical value. As I waited for him to return, I overheard his younger
son arguing fervently against his offer to show me the card. A little later, the son
returned to say that his father could not find his refugee card. When the father
returned, he shrugged off his futile search by suggesting it did not matter since they
were not refugees anymore.
The card, clearly, was an uncomfortable reminder of a difficult and often inglorious
past, and a matter of disagreement within the family. Whether the card went missing
or was hidden wilfully, its absence signified its irrelevance for the family more than five
decades later. The family over the years had gained success in business and could choose
to keep or dispense with this relic from the past. They had been able to self-rehabilitate
themselves, and therefore their refugee identity was no longer central to them.
However, this option was not available to Kewal Ram, for whom the card was a
necessary proof of identity when he interacted with the state authorities. In the eyes of
the state, he had failed to be a success since he continued knocking on the doors of
different authorities even after five decades.
The core principle of the state’s refugee rehabilitation policies was self-rehabilitation
– aided and initiated by the state but to be self-executed by the refugees in order to
become well-integrated citizens of India. The idea of self-rehabilitation, in fact, carried
within it two seemingly complementary processes – of being made independent of the
state, though upon the state’s insistence, and becoming self-reliant through one’s active
efforts. Both processes worked simultaneously towards a common goal of relocating the
newcomers on the citizenship map, yet they carried tensions and different outcomes
from the very beginning. While some refugees – owners of social and economic capitals
– were able to become self-reliant from the start, others who did not have resources had
to be made independent by the state. Kewal Ram belonged to the latter category of
refugees who did not grow out of the shadows of the state. While the officials at the
resettlement office found his pleas a waste of time and categorized him a failure, it was
hardly a matter of debate that the state had failed him not only by not focusing on his
needs, but also by thwarting his attempts to begin small-scale independent ventures.
The state’s attention, from the very beginning, had been on resourceful refugees.
These individuals and groups were not beholden to the state for their everyday
existence since they owned private means and social networks of support. Even though
their journeys had little in common with the stories of violence, mayhem and shortages
of food and water along the way, they were not only seen as representatives of the
refugee experience but also considered leaders of refugee communities. Thus, being
labelled ‘refugee’, and a self-reliant one at that, was to be given a desirable identity that
helped integrate the newcomers in the upper echelons of the host society. This way one
could draw upon the moral capital invested in the imaginary of refugee – without
having experienced the hardships and struggles popularly associated with it – and yet
be seen as an ideal example of a self-reliant refugee based on one’s own social capital.
Three conclusions may be drawn to sum up the discussions above. First, while there
was universal sympathy for an archetype of refugee – hardworking but fallen on bad
times – this did not always translate into concrete support since individuals seldom
match the ideal. The mythical persona of refugee was actually constitutive of a wide
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range of distinctions, whereas the state policies were made following the one-size-fits-
all principle. Second, one’s position as a post-colonial citizen was shaped by the
relationship one had with the state: the greater one’s ability to be self-reliant, the better
one’s chances of gaining a firm foothold in the new citizenry. Finally, it was not only
the state-dependents who were enchanted with state power; it was also the self-reliant
refugees who appealed to the state for recognition of their social eminence and
advancement. Self-rehabilitation was not always a display of initiative and hard work,
but often an expression of resourcefulness in manoeuvring the authorities in everyday
life. The policy of self-rehabilitation, in fact, inadvertently rewarded those who owned
social capital and could manage on their own, rather than supporting those who really
needed state help. Those left on the margins of the new citizenry symbolized the state’s
failure to design policies that focused on the most needy and subaltern of the refugees.
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